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After extended conflict, states must move quickly to re-establish government presence and credibility, 
particularly in areas that have traditionally lacked access to state services. As a case study, we examine 
Colombia’s 2007–2010 pilot program, the Plan de Consolidación Integral de la Macarena (PCIM), in 
particular its component project Progreso, a program for immediate rural enterprise intervention. Progreso’s 
relative success stemmed from its commitment to facilitating both demand and supply for public services: 
demand by supporting the growth of producer organizations that need state services, and supply by building 
capacity among local actors with whom state services can interact.
Key Messages
•	 Governments must arrive 
and provide services as  
soon as possible after a 
traumatic event, and 
especially post-conflict, as 
part of a long-term sustained 
plan. 
•	 Immediate intervention with 
a market focus appears  
to be both an effective and 
sustainable strategy to 
facilitate the crowding-in of 
public and private services, 
and may help increase 
security by consolidating 
government presence. 
  
•	 Progreso may be a helpful 
model, as the program 
successfully strengthened 
the linkages both along 
supply chains, and with and 
between the government 
institutions serving them.
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Strategic context
Colombia has experienced many years of 
continuous armed conflict, and has traditionally 
struggled to maintain state control over its entire 
territory. One such battleground area was 
Macarena, a traditional stronghold of illegal 
armed groups and a center of illicit production. 
The region is isolated from transport, markets, 
national government presence, and other 
services. 
In 2007, the Colombian government piloted an 
approach in the Macarena that combined 
military, police, and civilian components to 
consolidate state presence. This approach, the 
“Plan de Consolidación Integral de la 
Macarena” (PCIM), promoted military and social 
recovery of the territory, while bringing national 
state services and institutions to local 
municipalities.
Nearly immediately after combat operations had 
ended, the PCIM used a quick-impact civil 
response to fill the governance gap between the 
de facto insurgent rule of law that had 
predominated before military operations, and the 
arrival of permanent state institutions. Towards 
this end, the PCIM focused on increasing the 
population’s perception of the legitimacy of the 
state.
The Progreso program for agroenterprise 
development followed the same civil response 
model for early results. Though the focus was on 
the rapid deployment of resources to win the 
“hearts and minds” of the population, the 
programming was strong and sustainable, 
producing many profitable initiatives and 
beginning to strengthen local institutions.
The Rural Enterprise Intervention 
Model
The Progreso model for immediate rural 
enterprise intervention aimed to address the 
needs of both small rural enterprises and the 
state institutions that support them. The program 
was divided into four phases: pre-implementation, 
implementation, strengthening, and 
institutionalization. 
Pre-implementation
•	 Territorial characterization: Complete a 
rapid site survey to better tailor response to 
local conditions.
•	 Defining the focus of work: Clearly 
communicate to all stakeholders the purpose 
of the intervention, having taken into 
account the economic, social, and 
governmental factors that might impact its 
successfulness.
•	 Team formation: Plan on 3-4 support staff 
per municipality. The typical Progreso team 
is composed of an agricultural extensionist, 
“We are acting in the short term, with a 
vision for the long term.”
 Miguel Reabold,  
 Director of USAID-OTI, Bogotá
2
Growing state presence: Immediate steps for rural enterprise interventions in conflict affected areas
an agroenterprise promoter, a technical 
assistant (for advice on processing and value 
addition) and sometimes partnership 
promoters linked to other government 
institutions.
Implementation
•	 Prioritization and financing: The 
extensionists, who manage this phase,  
search for existing organizations and, with 
local residents, develop business proposals 
that can then be presented to a program 
funding committee. The committee 
authorizes one round of in-kind (not in cash) 
capitalization funding. In-kind grants require 
increased private sector engagement: the 
businesses funded by the committee are 
expected to invest their own resources into 
the project, and to seek out other local 
funding.
•	 Promoting state presence: Local program 
actors reach out to existing government 
institutions to bring them into the process as 
early as possible. Creating a space for 
communication early on permits the 
generation of collective knowledge and 
improves local service provision. The 
producer organizations also connect with 
Figure 1. Agroenterprise Intervention Model. Developed by the author.
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Rapid Intervention Goals
 1. Promote confidence in and legitimacy  
 of the national government.
 2. Generate income and stimulate the  
 local licit economy.
 3. Strengthen organizations and   
 entrepreneurial skills.
 4. Grow social capital.
 5. Connect legal economy to local and  
 regional markets.
local services to gain funding or support for 
their projects. Later, formal multi-agency 
“coordination roundtables” facilitate 
connections between agricultural 
development stakeholders.1
Strengthening
•	 Strengthening business initiatives: The 
agroenterprise promoters provide business 
and organizational strengthening services to 
the chosen organizations, and help them 
increase sustainability by creating 
capitalization funds. Concurrently, the 
technical assistants offer specialized advice 
to producer groups.2
•	 State institutions: Regular meetings of 
“coordination roundtables” facilitate 
communication between local development 
actors, program coordinators, local 
government, and producer organizations. 
These roundtables facilitate the rapid 
intervention program in training local 
institutions on market-based techniques.
Institutionalization
As organizations stabilize, or when the program 
concludes, Progreso service provision ends. 
As program support winds down, some 
organizations will fail, some will be self-sustaining 
because of their strong market linkages, many 
will begin to form second-order organizations or 
1. A coordination roundtable’s purpose is to 
define local demands for agricultural services 
and rural development, and to promote their 
resolution by the responsible entities.
2. The capitalization funds, recommended to 
producers by the agroenterprise promoters, are 
formal agreements that improve business 
sustainability by requiring organizations to 
reinvest a certain percentage of their gross 
revenue back into their businesses. 
business associations, and many will remain 
linked to the public sector for continued  
support. Because of the groundwork laid by 
program officials in earlier stages, the hope is  
to see the gradual institutionalization of 
businesses and organizational strengthening, 
long-term state presence and strong linkages 
between the public and private sector. 
Application and results
USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), 
through the US government contractor CREA/
Colombia, and with technical support from the 
International Center for Tropical Agriculture 
(CIAT), implemented Progreso, an immediate 
response program for rural enterprise 
development in the Macarena region of Meta. It 
began in late 2007, running concurrently with  
the PCIM initiative headed by the Colombian 
military and comprising part of the early civilian 
effort.
Rapid response
The program took about 3 months from arrival 
in the area and identification of projects  
to grant materials delivery, an extremely short 
timeline for these types of projects. As the 
program continued, extensionists selected  
new projects for funding and support. Though 
the program had explicitly short-term goals,  
its view towards creating sustainable  
businesses was designed to have longer term 
impacts.
In situations requiring emergency intervention, 
state institutions in the area will likely be weak  
or nonexistent. Progreso builds stronger 
producer organizations, giving service providers a 
more visible population with whom to work. In 
this way, the program can facilitate the state’s 
arrival by reducing the transaction costs of 
entering the area.
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Figure 2. Sources of Program Support. 
September Co-Financing 
Report, CREA/Colombia, 2010.
Progreso
Community
Local government
Staff
Program leadership came from within the 
contractor’s staff, often without the significant 
day-to-day involvement of local Colombian 
authorities. The financing committee was 
composed of the head of each body supporting 
the project: USAID-OTI, USAID-Alternative 
Development, PCIM, and CREA. The contractor 
chose the program agents, who were hired 
primarily from the department in which the 
program was implemented. These agents lived 
and worked full-time in the municipalities, and 
were provided with training to complement their 
existing knowledge and skills. However, to the 
probable detriment of the program, the turnover 
rate among the local program agents was fairly 
high; their average time on the job was 
approximately a year.
Intervention
•	 Funding projects: The average value of a 
Progreso grant, given as an in-kind donation, 
was $26,575. These relatively high-value 
grants provided adequate capital 
equipment and resources to stakeholders. 
Moreover, by providing only in-kind 
contributions, Progreso was able to control 
what was purchased with program funds, 
and required a high level of engagement 
from private sector partners. Significantly, 
the average total grant value per producer 
organization was $46,212, meaning that 
local governments and communities 
contributed nearly half of the grant monies. 
For an average-sized business with  
42 families, this amounts to $1,100 per 
family. 
•	 Extensionists: After project approval, the 
extensionists ensured the delivery of goods, 
measured program impact, and recruited 
Case Study: A Beekeeper Association
In 2008, Agroapícola del Ariari, then an 8-year-old association of beekeepers, became 
the first project approved by Progreso in the municipality of Puerto Rico. At the time, 
Agroapícola was a group of 22 families, but its composition changed over time, as some 
families were more committed than others. Today, 13 of the founders remain with the 
association, and 12 new families have joined. The group took advantage of a  
$24,800 grant from Progreso, and its members invested about $1,400 of their own 
money. After financial support from and business consultations with the CPGA, Acción 
Social, and Progreso, the business members learned how to create a capitalization fund, 
worked on institutional strengthening, and focused on better participation in local supply 
chains. Moreover, the business now grows its own fruits to pack with its original honey 
product, creating added value. Today, Agroapícola reports an excellent level of 
production and sells its products under the name Ricura Natural in Puerto Rico 
municipality itself, as well as in Granada, Villavicencio, and Bogotá.
new projects. Extensionists focused on 
supporting projects located in secure zones, 
presented by already-existing groups, with a 
single product that the members already 
knew how to produce, to ensure a rapid 
program pace. 
•	 Supporting businesses: The agroenterprise 
promoters were primarily responsible for the 
continuing support of businesses enrolled in 
the Progreso program. The agroenterprise 
promoters’ full-time job was to travel in their 
assigned areas, working with companies and 
promoting the importance of business 
development skills and services. Early in the 
program, they emphasized understanding of 
supply chains and markets, 
commercialization of products, and 
creation of capitalization funds. Later, they 
helped with troubleshooting, brought 
producers on market tours, and helped 
them link to state institutions.
Challenges
•	 Intervention timing: The intervention 
began after a large-scale eradication of illicit 
crops and a military campaign. Other  
rapid-response programs had to ensure  
food security and safety before Progreso 
could begin.
•	 Insecurity: Initial intervention efforts were 
restricted to urban zones because of poor 
rural security conditions. 
•	 Distance from markets: The Macarena 
region is isolated from the national markets; 
road security is poor, and much of the 
access is via air or water, presenting  
problems for transport of goods and supply 
chain linkages.
•	 Social capital: PCIM worked concurrently 
on building social capital in a region that  
had a strong culture of illegality and distrust. 
This aspect made organizational 
strengthening a key component of the 
intervention. 
•	 Awareness of available state services: 
Though many programs exist at the national 
level to support rural producers, knowledge  
of these programs and how to access them 
was limited. Future interventions should 
incorporate a capacity-building section that 
addresses this problem.
•	 Local program actor turnover: The brevity 
of the average time in job (one year) hurt the 
continuity of service provision. This could 
be an indicator of a number of more serious 
problems, either in terms of individual 
capacity, the local environment, or the 
program itself and should be more carefully 
documented.
•	 Sustainability of businesses: The first 
round of the intervention did not include 
capitalization funds for re-investment into  
the businesses. These funds should be 
incorporated from the outset.
•	 Sustainability of state services: Outside 
agencies funded and led the Progreso 
program. Minimal involvement by the 
Colombian government forebodes problems 
after program closure for the Colombian 
agencies working independently to provide 
the same level of services. With increased 
security, producer groups will continue to 
demand more and deeper services from the 
government, which must continue to seek 
sustainable solutions. 
Business results
As of October 2010, Progreso had funded 
166 projects and directly helped almost  
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7,000 families. Almost 50% of these projects 
had organized themselves into local trade 
associations, though not all of the projects 
involved have stopped receiving support in 
entrepreneurial capacity building. Less than 5% 
of the projects had failed, and 30% of the 
funded projects were operating without 
assistance from Progreso. About 23% of the 
projects had, in addition to Progreso’s support, 
accessed funding or help from other 
government programs, such as rural 
development bank funding, or courses from the 
Centros Provinciales de Gestión 
Agroempresarial (CPGA), the Colombian 
Agriculture and Livestock Institute (ICA), or the 
National Learning Service (SENA).
Government legitimacy
Many companies that participated in Progreso 
are now accessing other government programs 
and even successfully competing for funding at 
the national level. In April 2009, a USAID survey 
of the area showed over 60% citizen confidence, 
a fairly high number that may be correlated with 
the success of Progreso, though additional 
assessments would be necessary to confirm 
causality. Coordination roundtables at the  
local and departmental levels also appear to 
have been successful in the preliminary  
stages, and they warrant further research into 
whether they would remain effective when 
scaled up. 
While the government provided business  
services in the case of Progreso, in future 
programs, the most capable actor in the area, 
whether public or private sector, should provide 
them. Even Progreso used a contractor to 
administer services. Another example is the 
Afghani Small and Medium Enterprise 
Development Program (SMEDP), which worked 
to develop a private business development 
services sector to partner with the government, 
as private sector actors were deemed to be  
more efficient than their public-sector 
counterparts. Progreso or its successor may 
therefore wish to explore the potential for 
government-sponsored service vouchers to 
move towards a model of public-private 
partnership for service provision.
Sustainability
The Progreso program was never designed to be 
a long-term provider of government services, and 
without follow-up programming and financing, 
the gains that it has made in strengthening the 
local economy will not continue. However, USAID 
and other international donors have designated 
follow-on support through similar Colombian 
government-sponsored programs, like Planes de 
Transición and Oportunidades Rurales. Some of 
the projects supported by Progreso have won 
subsequent funding through nationally 
competitive bids to entities like the Ministry of 
Agriculture.
Future plans
The PCIM pilot program is being expanded 
across five broad security corridors in 2011 
through Colombia’s Plan Nacional de 
Consolidación (National Consolidation Plan).
Policy recommendations
For the PCIM 
•	 Continue to promote interinstitutional exchange and cooperation, 
ensuring a local lead for coordination efforts.
•	 Add formal capacity building services to the agroenterprise promoters’ 
responsibilities, to help organizations learn how to access state services 
and apply for grant funding.
•	 Explore ways of making the basic model become more self-sufficient and 
sustainable.
For future immediate agroenterprise intervention programs 
•	 Ensure security and host government buy-in before implementation. 
•	 Focus the program on specific value chains. This links farmers to chains 
and facilitates associations among farmer groups, making service 
provision simpler.
•	 Provide grants in-kind, and at appropriate levels of funding, to allow 
producers to achieve economies of scale.
•	 Speed is key to success—work with existing groups and with products 
they already know how to produce.
•	 Promote linkages between state institutions and program-supported 
producer groups for sustainability after program conclusion.
•	 Be flexible.
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 Result Number of businesses Percent of total
 Failed or disbanded projects 6 4%
 Self-sufficient, with strong links to value chains 50 30%
 Formation of business associations 81 49%
 Linked to other public sector programs 38 23%
Project results, March-May 2010. CREA/Colombia.
